

SAMPLE CHAPTER

Parapsychology

Research on Exceptional Experiences

Edited by Jane Henry

First published 2005 by Routledge
27 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex, BN3 2FA

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

© 2005 Selection and editorial matter, Jane Henry; individual
chapters, the contributors

Typeset in Times by Garfield Morgan, Rhayader, Powys, UK
Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow,
Cornwall
Paperback cover design by Sandra Heath

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

This publication has been produced with paper manufactured to strict
environmental standards and with pulp derived from sustainable
forests.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Parapsychology : research on exceptional experiences / [edited by]
Jane Henry.— 1st ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-415-21359-2 (hardcover)

1. Parapsychology—Research. I. Henry, Jane.

BF1040.5.P37 2004

130—dc22

2004003837

ISBN 0-415-21359-2 (hbk)

ISBN 0-415-21360-6 (pbk)

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	viii
<i>About the authors</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xii
Introduction	1
Parapsychology	5
1 Parapsychology	7
JANE HENRY	
2 Methodology	28
JULIE MILTON	
3 Meta-analyses	42
DEBORAH L. DELANOY	
4 Psychological factors	64
CAROLINE WATT	
5 Scepticism	80
CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH	
Paranormal cognition	91
6 Second sight	93
SHARI A. COHN-SIMMEN	
7 Extrasensory perception	99
JOHN BELOFF WITH JANE HENRY	

8 Precognition and premonitions	108
KEITH HEARNE AND JANE HENRY	
9 Animal psi	114
RUPERT SHELDRAKE	
Paranormal action	123
10 Psychokinesis	125
JANE HENRY	
11 Healing	137
DANIEL J. BENOR	
12 Shamanism	149
STANLEY KRIPPNER	
Anomalous experience	165
13 Coincidence	167
JANE HENRY	
14 Apparitions and encounters	175
ANDREW MACKENZIE AND JANE HENRY	
15 Out-of-body experiences	188
SUSAN BLACKMORE	
16 Near-death experiences	196
SUSAN BLACKMORE	
17 Imagery	204
ROBIN TAYLOR	
After-life associations	213
18 Survival	215
ALAN GAULD	
19 Reincarnation	224
IAN STEVENSON	

20 Religion	233
MICHAEL PERRY	
Appendices	243
Appendix 1: Glossary	245
Appendix 2: Websites, organisations and journals	248
WYLLYS POYNTON	
<i>Index</i>	254

Scepticism

Christopher C. French

Doubt is not a pleasant mental state, but certainty is a ridiculous one.

Voltaire

Historical roots of scepticism

According to *Chambers English Dictionary* (1988), the word ‘scepticism’ (or ‘skepticism’ to use the American spelling) is derived from the Greek words *skeptikos*, which means ‘thoughtful’, and *skeptesthai*, meaning ‘to consider’. It is defined as ‘that condition in which the mind is before it has arrived at conclusive opinions: doubt [. . .]’. This chapter will discuss the idea of scepticism as it applies to a consideration of paranormal claims. We will begin by considering the philosophical antecedents of modern scepticism (for more detail, see Kurtz 1992).

Hume’s essay *Of Miracles*, published in 1748, is particularly relevant to a discussion of scepticism as it relates to the paranormal (Grey 1994). Hume presented a strong argument that one would never be rationally justified in believing that a miracle had occurred. He defined a miracle as an event which violates a law of nature, a definition which would be taken by many as including paranormal events. It is important to realise that Hume was not claiming to have proved that miracles have never occurred, only that we would never be justified in believing that they have. He proposed the following principle:

No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless that testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.

(Hume pp. 115–16, in Grey 1994, p. 294)

Although this principle allows for the possibility that the evidence in favour of a miracle might outweigh the evidence against it, in practice, Hume argued, this never happens. A number of factors undermine the credibility of miraculous claims, not least of which is the problem of witness reliability. Is it more likely that the person or persons making the claim are deceivers

or else themselves deceived or that a law of nature has been violated? Whereas the evidence supporting violations of laws of nature is sparse, possibly even non-existent, we are surrounded by evidence that people sometimes lie and sometimes make mistakes.

Hume's argument against accepting miraculous claims is a particular example of the application of Occam's Razor, a methodological principle commonly attributed to William of Ockham (*c.* 1285–1349), which states that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity ('*Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*'). Essentially, this principle advises that if there are two possible explanations for a particular phenomenon, one of which is in line with known laws of logic and science whereas the other requires the postulation of previously unknown forces, in the interests of parsimony the former is to be preferred. Occam's Razor is one of the fundamental guiding principles of scepticism.

A second fundamental principle is that claims must be falsifiable. Philosophers of science have not found it easy to distinguish science from non-science or pseudoscience. Much has been made of Popper's (1972, 1980) notion of falsifiability in this regard. If a statement is not falsifiable, then it cannot be scientific. This is an important notion and one which can have a profound impact upon one's view of the world if taken to heart. It might appear at first glance that if a particular belief system can account for any outcome, this would indicate its strength. In fact, in scientific terms, such a belief system cannot be thought of as a scientific theory at all. If there is no turn of events that would falsify the belief system, then it clearly lacks any predictive power. It can only apparently account for events retrospectively. Non-falsifiability is a common characteristic of pseudosciences.

Modern scepticism: legitimate and illegitimate

Kurtz has developed his notion of scepticism as a positive constructive approach (e.g. Kurtz 1992, 1994, 1996). He describes his new scepticism as being selective, in that it does not entail doubting everything at once but is limited to the context being considered. It maintains that we are able to develop reliable knowledge about the world. It does not dogmatically reject paranormal claims prior to considering the evidence but is willing to pronounce disbelief if the evidence is found to be inadequate. Paranormal claims should be evaluated through careful scientific investigation using the following criteria: (a) empirical tests based upon observation, (b) logical standards of coherence, and (c) experimental tests in which ideas are judged by their consequences. Kurtz has achieved considerable success in promoting his approach, largely through the activities of the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), which he founded in 1976. In addition, Kurtz is president of Prometheus Books, a publishing house which specialises in the publication of sceptical books.

However, it is not only those who doubt the existence of paranormal forces that have promoted the judicious application of scepticism. Parapsychologist John Palmer (1986) has made the important point that those traditionally labelled as 'sceptics' regarding the paranormal are often not true sceptics at all. They tend to uncritically accept any non-paranormal explanation for an ostensibly paranormal event (OPE), no matter how far-fetched, and only adopt a sceptical approach when considering explanations which would imply the existence of paranormal forces. Palmer suggests that such critics might more accurately be described as conventional theorists (CTs), a term intended to convey the belief of this group that ultimately all OPEs will be explained in terms of conventional scientific concepts. A true sceptic, according to Palmer, would adopt an attitude of doubt towards all unproven explanations of OPEs. Despite the importance and value of Palmer's (1986) arguments, it is unlikely that the phrase 'conventional theorist' will enter into common usage. 'Sceptic' is a handy, if imprecise, description of CTs and will be used in this sense for the remainder of this chapter.

Palmer (1986) calls for the adoption of a new approach which he calls progressive scepticism. This would require a critical attitude towards all unproven explanations of OPEs and rigorous scientific research from both the paranormal and conventional perspectives in attempting to provide definitive explanations. The burden of proof with respect to paranormal claims should not be seen as resting solely with the proponents of the paranormal. Those offering non-paranormal accounts should also be required to produce empirical evidence in support of their arguments.

Sceptical organisations

Numerous organisations now exist, both nationally and internationally, to promote a sceptical approach to paranormal and related claims (see website below). Probably the most influential organisation is the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP, pronounced 'sigh cop'). Kendrick Frazier (1996), a member of CSICOP's Executive Council, provides a sympathetic account of the aims and achievements of the group (but see Hansen 1992 for a more critical assessment). Frazier (1996, p. 168) describes CSICOP as 'an independent, non-profit organization that evaluates paranormal and fringe-science claims from a scientific viewpoint and attempts to provide the public and scholars with scientifically reliable information about them. It also encourages an appreciation of scientific thinking and the application of science and reason to important public issues'.

The means by which CSICOP attempts to achieve its objectives as indicated in their journal are: to maintain a network of people interested in critically examining paranormal, fringe-science, and other claims, and in

contributing to consumer education; to prepare bibliographies of published materials that carefully examine such claims; to encourage research by objective and impartial enquiry in areas where it is needed; to convene conferences and meetings; to publish articles that examine claims of the paranormal; not to reject claims on a priori grounds, antecedent to enquiry, but to examine them objectively and carefully. CSICOP also responds to media enquiries by providing contacts with informed sceptics to comment upon paranormal and pseudoscientific claims.

There is little doubt that CSICOP has had considerable success in disseminating its message. The *Skeptical Inquirer* currently has a circulation in excess of 50,000, including 35,000 subscribers, with readers in seventy-two countries. CSICOP has also been successful in inspiring the formation of local or regional sceptical groups in the majority of American states as well as in twenty-eight countries (including the UK).

Whereas CSICOP and its supporters often view themselves as lonely defenders of rationalism and common sense, their critics often see them as self-appointed 'scientific vigilantes'. The truth is that some sceptics do seem to over-emphasise the dangers in what they see as 'a rising tide of irrationalism' in modern society and to have an inordinate fondness for military metaphors when describing their 'battles' against this threat. There is also some truth in the criticism that CSICOP sometimes fails to make distinctions between its targets, attacking the trivial and the serious with equal vigour.

However, although recognising CSICOP's imperfections, it is probably fair to say that most moderates on both sides of the psi debate acknowledge the vital role played by this organisation and its many positive achievements. There have recently been signs that CSICOP has mellowed somewhat in its attitude to serious experimental parapsychologists. One notable example of this constructive approach is the joint communiqué from critic Ray Hyman and parapsychologist Charles Honorton with respect to the ganzfeld studies (Hyman and Honorton 1986). Both agreed that the data set from these studies demonstrated a real effect, but there was disagreement regarding whether or not psi had been the cause of the effect. Perhaps more importantly, the communiqué included a detailed list of guidelines for the conduct of future research using that technique. Such constructive criticism can only help serious researchers to improve the quality of their evidence.

It is undoubtedly the case, however, that many of the targets of CSICOP's criticism would not be seen by serious parapsychologists and psychological researchers as likely candidates for providing convincing evidence of paranormal forces. To criticise CSICOP for this, however, is to ignore the fact that the organisation explicitly sees public education as one of its main roles. Although many serious proponents of the paranormal may be unimpressed by the feats of psychic superstars such as Uri Geller or the

claims of psychic detectives and psychic healers, many members of the public are convinced by uncritical media portrayals of such individuals. Similarly, even though many professional astrologers would condemn newspaper horoscopes, many members of the public take them quite seriously. CSICOP's criticisms of such areas are useful in providing an alternative point of view, particularly in the realm of media discussions. Furthermore, it is obviously in the public interest that charlatans claiming healing powers are exposed as dangerous frauds. One example would be the Reverend Peter Popoff who claimed to receive messages directly from God informing him of details of congregation members' illnesses. In fact, details were relayed by Popoff's wife via a tiny radio receiver in Popoff's ear (Randi 1987). Another would be the Filipino surgeons who use sleight of hand and animal tissue to fool cancer victims into believing that malignant tumours are being removed from their bodies without the use of surgical instruments.

The psychology of belief and disbelief

Sceptics are not convinced by the evidence put forward in support of the existence of psi. With respect to attempts to establish psi scientifically, they emphasise various problems that have historically plagued parapsychology, including methodological sloppiness, fraud on the part of participants and experimenters, and inability to replicate effects (Hyman 1985). In fairness, the recent evidence presented by parapsychologists relating to the auto-ganzfeld technique (Bem and Honorton 1994) and remote viewing (Utts 1996, Hyman 1996) presented a strong challenge to those sceptical of the existence of paranormal forces (see Chapter 3 on the parapsychology meta-analyses). However, it is often wise to withhold judgement for a while where controversial claims are concerned. After all, it took four decades to conclusively establish that Soal's positive results could not be taken at face value (Hyman 1985). A subsequent meta-analysis by Milton and Wiseman (1999) of ganzfeld studies carried out after those reviewed by Bem and Honorton failed to find any significant deviation from mean chance expectation. Furthermore, remote viewing studies have been severely criticised by Marks (2000). It can reasonably be argued that psi has not yet been established in the laboratory beyond reasonable doubt.

Most people, of course, do not base their belief in the paranormal upon an assessment of the scientific evidence. Many surveys have shown that one of the main reasons given for believing in the paranormal is personal experience of ostensibly paranormal events (along with reports of similar experiences from trusted others and the media). Although sceptics are always aware of the possibility of hoaxes, in general they do not doubt the sincerity of individuals reporting such experiences. It is not the experiences

which sceptics question, but the interpretation of the experiences as necessarily involving psi. There is no doubt that many situations may appear to reflect the operation of paranormal forces when in fact known psychological and physical factors are all that is required to explain them (Alcock 1981, Blackmore 1990, French 1992, Hines 2003, Hoggart and Hutchinson 1995, Zusne and Jones 1989; see also Chapter 4 on psychological factors in parapsychology).

This raises the interesting possibility that believers and sceptics may be psychologically different in important ways. Certain types of ostensibly paranormal experience may be explained in terms of the operation of universal cognitive biases. French (1992) discusses several relevant psychological factors including the illusion of control, the tendency to seek confirmatory evidence for our beliefs, poor appreciation of the probability of coincidences, and lack of knowledge of conjuring techniques. There is suggestive evidence that believers in the paranormal may be more prone to these biases, even though they affect virtually everyone to a greater or lesser extent. Many parapsychologists, most notably Harvey Irwin (e.g. Irwin 1993) and Michael Thalbourne (e.g. Thalbourne and Delin 1994), have also carried out extensive research in this area.

Sceptical researchers are likely to draw different conclusions from those of proponents of the paranormal when psychological differences between believers and sceptics are found. For example, the sceptic is likely to argue that because believers are more fantasy-prone than sceptics (e.g. Irwin 1993), many ostensibly paranormal experiences are simply fantasies. Proponents of the paranormal, on the other hand, are likely to give serious consideration to the possibility that fantasy-prone individuals might possess psychological characteristics which make it more likely that they will experience genuine paranormal events (see, for example, Thalbourne 1996).

Relatively little attention has been paid directly to the psychology of disbelief, the implicit assumption being that it is paranormal belief which requires explanation. From a sceptical perspective, this is of course quite reasonable. In general, when proponents of the paranormal have considered the psychology of scepticism, they have mainly emphasised negative psychological characteristics, just as sceptics have done when considering paranormal belief. Irwin (1989), for example, considers a number of psychodynamic accounts of the extreme emotional commitment to 'the cause' which some sceptics appear to demonstrate. Many of these psychodynamic accounts involve the unsubstantiated idea that 'paranormal belief stirs certain repressed fantasies and perceptions of our early childhood'. The related idea that sceptics are afraid of the paranormal is also frequently voiced. Although this may apply in some cases, it cannot apply to all. Many sceptics, including Susan Blackmore, Anthony Flew, Chris Scott, John Taylor and me, were once believers with a very positive attitude towards the paranormal.

Sceptics frequently report, on the basis of well-controlled experiments, that believers tend to distort evidence in such a way that it appears to offer support for their paranormal beliefs. However, proponents of psi can also cite instances of sceptics distorting the scientific evidence in such a way that it appears to offer less support for the paranormal than it actually does. Keil (1990) claims that Gardner misrepresented investigations of Pavel Stepanek's alleged psychic powers and both Child (1985) and Palmer (1986) discuss the ways in which the experiments at Maimonides Medical Center on possible ESP in dreams have been misreported by sceptics (e.g. Zusne and Jones 1982; note that no such misrepresentation of these studies is to be found in the second edition of this book (Zusne and Jones 1989).

We should not be surprised that both sides in the psi debate will occasionally misrepresent the evidence in such a way that their own position appears to be somewhat stronger than it actually is. After all, to err is human and a great deal of psychological research shows that we are far more likely to notice errors in an argument if we disagree with its conclusions than if we agree with them. The fact that errors of reporting occur should not necessarily be taken as a deliberate attempt to mislead. Clearly, it is reasonable to place less faith in a commentator who has repeatedly demonstrated such academic sloppiness, but there are probably few of us who have not noticed the occasional error in our own previous writings.

Edge *et al.* (1986) have pointed out several negative characteristics shared by extremists on both sides of the psi debate:

Each is trying to persuade others and thus may make liberal use of the techniques of persuasion. Frequently used ploys include: emotional rhetoric; *ad hominem* arguments, including unsupported charges of incompetence; ridicule; guilt by association; generalizing to the whole from the faults of the part, including focusing on extremists in the 'opposing camp' and generalizing to those of moderation; obviously fallacious reasoning; and ignoring or superficially dismissing information counter to the strongly held position. Experimental research may occasionally be conducted, with unwarranted generalizations drawn from little data or from data that could obviously be affected by experimenter bias. Extreme advocates and counteradvocates [of the existence of psi] may claim that their position needs no external support, that it is intuitively obvious to those willing to take it seriously; others are too biased or incompetent.

(Edge *et al.* 1986, p. 322)

Conclusion

On the positive side, moderates in the psi debate also share many characteristics, including a commitment to the scientific method as the best

means to resolve the issue and a recognition of the necessity for a constructively sceptical approach. Meaningful dialogue between moderate proponents of the paranormal and moderate sceptics is essential for the future progress of parapsychology.

Recommended reading

Introductory

- Hoggart, S. and Hutchinson, M. (1995) *Bizarre Beliefs*, London: Richard Cohen Books. Beautifully illustrated and highly readable – at last, a coffee-table book for sceptics!
- Randi, J. (1982) *Flim-Flam! The Truth about Unicorns, Parapsychology and Other Delusions*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus. Entertaining exposé of a wide range of pseudoscientific topics.

Advanced

- Alcock, J.E. (1981) *Parapsychology: Science or Magic?* Oxford: Pergamon Press. Well-argued sceptical critique of parapsychology by a leading social psychologist.
- Cardena, E., Lynn, S.J. and Krippner, S. (eds) (2000) *Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientific Evidence*, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Comprehensive review chapters of relevant topics.
- Dawkins, R. (1998) *Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder*, London: Penguin. Passionately argued case in favour of science and against pseudoscience as the best means for gaining true insight into the nature of the universe.
- Hines, T. (2003) *Pseudoscience and the Paranormal*. 2nd edn, Amherst, NY: Prometheus. Entertaining critical overview of pseudoscience and the paranormal.
- Kurtz, P. (ed.) (1985) *A Sceptic's Handbook of Parapsychology*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus. A highly readable collection of critical essays on parapsychology, mainly from a sceptical perspective.
- Vyse, S.A. (1997) *Believing in Magic: The Psychology of Superstition*, New York: Oxford University Press. Well-written summary of psychological research into the formation and maintenance of superstitious thinking.
- Skeptiks < <http://www.skeptiks.com.au/features/links/skeporg.htm> > Offers links to over fifty websites of sceptical organisations.

References

- Baker, R.A. and Nickell, J. (1992) *Missing Pieces: How to Investigate Ghosts, UFOs, Psychics and Other Mysteries*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Bem, D.J. and Honorton, C. (1994) Does psi exist? Replicable evidence for an anomalous process of information transfer, *Psychological Bulletin*, 115, 4–18.
- Blackmore, S. (1990) The lure of the paranormal, *New Scientist*, 22 September, 62–5.

- Blackmore, S.J. (1993) *Dying to Live: Science and the Near-Death Experience*, London: Grafton.
- Buckman, R. and Sabbagh, K. (1993) *Magic or Medicine? An Investigation into Healing*, London: Macmillan.
- Child, I.L. (1985) Psychology and anomalous observations: the question of ESP in dreams, *American Psychologist*, 40, 1219–30.
- Edge, H.L., Morris, R.L., Rush, J.H. and Palmer, J. (1986) *Foundations of Parapsychology: Exploring the Boundaries of Human Capability*, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Frazier, K. (ed.) (1981) *Paranormal Borderlands of Science*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Frazier, K. (ed.) (1986) *Science Confronts the Paranormal*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Frazier, K. (ed.) (1991) *The Hundredth Monkey and Other Paradigms of the Paranormal*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Frazier, K. (1996) Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP). In G. Stein (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal*, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 168–80.
- Frazier, K. (ed.) (1998) *Encounters with the Paranormal: Science, Knowledge, and Belief*, Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
- French, C.C. (1992) Factors underlying belief in the paranormal: do sheep and goats think differently? *The Psychologist*, 5, 295–9.
- Gardner, M. (1957) *Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science*, New York: Dover.
- Gardner, M. (1981) *Science: Good, Bad and Bogus*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Grey, W. (1994) Philosophy and the paranormal. Part 2: Skepticism, miracles, and knowledge, *Skeptical Inquirer*, 18, 288–94.
- Hansen, G.P. (1992) CSICOP and the skeptics: an overview, *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, 86, 19–63.
- Hyman, R. (1985) A critical historical overview of parapsychology. In P. Kurtz (ed.) *A Skeptic's Handbook of Parapsychology*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 3–96.
- Hyman, R. (1996) Evaluation of a program on anomalous mental phenomena, *Journal of Scientific Exploration*, 10, 31–58.
- Hyman, R. and Honorton, C. (1986) A joint communiqué: the psi ganzfeld controversy, *Journal of Parapsychology*, 50, 351–64.
- Irwin, H.J. (1989) On paranormal disbelief: the psychology of the sceptic. In G.K. Zollschan, J.F. Schumaker and G.F. Walsh (eds) *Exploring the Paranormal: Perspectives on Belief and Experience*, Bridport, Dorset: Prism Press, 305–12.
- Irwin, H.J. (1993) Belief in the paranormal: a review of the empirical literature, *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, 97, 1–39.
- Keil, J. (1990) How a skeptic misrepresents the research with Stepanek: a review of Martin Gardner's 'How Not to Test a Psychic', *Journal of Parapsychology*, 54, 151–67.
- Kurtz, P. (1992) *The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Kurtz, P. (1994) The new skepticism, *Skeptical Inquirer*, 18, 134–41.
- Kurtz, P. (1996) Skepticism and the paranormal. In G. Stein (ed.) *The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal*, Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 684–701.

- Marks, D. (2000) *The Psychology of the Psychic*, 2nd edn, Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
- Milton, J. and Wiseman, R. (1999) Does psi exist? Lack of replication of an anomalous process of information transfer, *Psychological Bulletin*, 125, 387–91.
- Palmer, J. (1986) Progressive skepticism: a critical approach to the psi controversy, *Journal of Parapsychology*, 50, 29–42.
- Popper, K. (1972) *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, 4th edn, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Popper, K. (1980) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 10th edn, London: Hutchinson.
- Randi, J. (1982) *The Truth About Uri Geller*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Randi, J. (1987) *The Faith Healers*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
- Sagan, C. (1996) *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark*, New York: Random House.
- Stein, G. (ed.) (1996) *The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal*, Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
- Thalbourne, M.A. (1996) An attempt to predict precognition scores using transliminality-relevant variables, *Journal of the Society for Psychical Research*, 61, 129–40.
- Thalbourne, M.A. and Delin, P.S. (1994) A common thread underlying belief in the paranormal, creative personality, mystical experience and psychopathology, *Journal of Parapsychology*, 58, 3–38.
- Utts, J. (1996) An assessment of the evidence for psychic functioning, *Journal of Scientific Exploration*, 10, 3–30.
- Wiseman, R. (1997) *Deception and Self-Deception: Investigating Psychics*, Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
- Zusne, L. and Jones, W.H. (1982) *Anomalistic Psychology*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Zusne, L. and Jones, W.H. (1989) *Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of Magical Thinking*, 2nd edn, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.