a member of his audience, "Do
you believe in God ?" He replied,
"I do not use the word because it is too vague." I think, this was the
wrong answer. He should have said, "I do not use the word 'God'
because it is too precise." This is why I speak of a "spiritual presence."
Perhaps this also is too precise.
It is better to be vaguely right than to be precisely wrong.
This enquiry is in some respects parallel to the question, What
bearing, if any, has our sense experience, e.g., our colour sensations,
upon the problems of the nature and structure of the universe? I
parallel." How far we can take the analogy seri-ously is itself one of our problems. But he who has perused nothing
beyond the preface of this book is not entitled forthwith to reject
the comparison—unless he wishes to convict himself of prejudice.
I write as a philosopher, and not as a mystic. I do not profess to
be an expert in any of the cultural areas of mysticism which thisbook discusses. I have selected in each area a limited number of
those whom I take to be the greatest mystics in that area and havebased my conclusions mainly on an intensive study of these. More-
over my approach to philosophy is that of an empiricist and an analyst.
But as an empiricist I do not hold that all experience must necessarily
be reducible to sense experience. And as an analyst I do not hold
that analysis is the sole business of philosophy. I attach the greatestvalue to what was once called "speculative philosophy," but consider
that analysis is an essential instrument of it. Analysis can be madean end in itself. But I prefer to use it as a preparatory step toward
discovery of truth.Most of my predecessors in the field of mysticism either were nottrained philosophers at all, or they thought in terms of philosophical
methods and ideas and idioms which we can no longer accept—atany rate in Anglo-Saxon lands. In these lands, the methods of phi-
losophy were revolutionized about fifty years ago by a small band ofmen among whom G. E. Moore was a main leader. I hold that what-
ever in that revolution is likely in future history to be adjudged of
lasting value can be seized and apprcipriated now without attaching
oneself to any of the one-sided rival schools of analysts who now divide
the field—the logical positivists, the Carnapian formalists, the Oxford"ordinary language" philosophers, the Wittgensteinian true believers.
Our predecessors in the field of mysticism have done nothing to
help us in many of the problems which I have had to discuss. I
have had to chart a lone course without guidance from the past.
Hence there are a number of ideas in this book which may seem
almost wholly novel, and not a little rash. I say this not in order toboast of originality, but on the contrary, because I hope that someof the deficiencies which my readers will find in my solutions may
receive a more ready pardon. I could not help raising questions which
appeared to be essential to the whole enquiry but which apparentlydid not occur to my predecessors at all. I had to struggle with them
as best I could.
It should be emphasized that in so difficult a field we cannot ex-pect "proofs," "disproofs," "refutations," "certainties." The mystic
indeed does not argue. He has his inner subjective certainty. But thisonly raises a new and puzzling problem for the poor philosopher. Atany rate, the utmost we can expect in this area is tentative hypotheses,reasonable opinions. And of course only nonscientists believe in thesupposed certainty of science. Scientists know that their solutions arehypothetical only; and ours will doubtless be much more so.
The writing of this book has been generously supported by the
Bollingen Foundation, which granted me a three-year fellowship,and then an extension of a fourth year. I am most grateful for their
W. T. S.